itself, nature incites us to endeavor to obtain it. Now, where this
strong desire is consistent and founded on prudence, it is by the
Stoics called [Greek: boulêsis], and the name which we give it is
volition; and this they allow to none but their wise man, and define it
thus: Volition is a reasonable desire; but whatever is incited too
violently in opposition to reason, that is a lust, or an unbridled
desire, which is discoverable in all fools. And, therefore, when we are
affected so as to be placed in any good condition, we are moved in two
ways; for when the mind is moved in a placid and calm motion,
consistent with reason, that is called joy; but when it exults with a
vain, wanton exultation, or immoderate joy, then that feeling may be
called immoderate ecstasy or transport, which they define to be an
elation of the mind without reason. And as we naturally desire good
things, so in like manner we naturally seek to avoid what is evil; and
this avoidance of which, if conducted in accordance with reason, is
called caution; and this the wise man alone is supposed to have: but
that caution which is not under the guidance of reason, but is attended
with a base and low dejection, is called fear. Fear is, therefore,
caution destitute of reason. But a wise man is not affected by any
present evil; while the grief of a fool proceeds from being affected
with an imaginary evil, by which his mind is contracted and sunk, since
it is not under the dominion of reason. This, then, is the first
definition, which makes grief to consist in a shrinking of the mind
contrary to the dictates of reason. Thus, there are four perturbations,
and but three calm rational emotions; for grief has no exact opposite.

VII. But they insist upon it that all perturbations depend on opinion
and judgment; therefore they define them more strictly, in order not
only the better to show how blamable they are, but to discover how much
they are in our power. Grief, then, is a recent opinion of some present