therefore, to have borne it with more moderation. But let us suppose
that while he was bearing this with moderation, the death of his
children had intervened; here would have started a fresh grief, which,
admitting it to be moderate in itself, yet still must have been a great
addition to the other. Now, to these let us add some acute pains of
body, the loss of his fortune, blindness, banishment. Supposing, then,
each separate misfortune to occasion a separate additional grief, the
whole would be too great to be supportable.

XVIII. The man who attempts to set bounds to vice acts like one who
should throw himself headlong from Leucate, persuaded that he could
stop himself whenever he pleased. Now, as that is impossible, so a
perturbed and disordered mind cannot restrain itself, and stop where it
pleases. Certainly whatever is bad in its increase is bad in its birth.
Now grief and all other perturbations are doubtless baneful in their
progress, and have, therefore, no small share of evil at the beginning;
for they go on of themselves when once they depart from reason, for
every weakness is self-indulgent, and indiscreetly launches out, and
does not know where to stop. So that it makes no difference whether you
approve of moderate perturbations of mind, or of moderate injustice,
moderate cowardice, and moderate intemperance; for whoever prescribes
bounds to vice admits a part of it, which, as it is odious of itself,
becomes the more so as it stands on slippery ground, and, being once
set forward, glides on headlong, and cannot by any means be stopped.

XIX. Why should I say more? Why should I add that the Peripatetics say
that these perturbations, which we insist upon it should be extirpated,
are not only natural, but were given to men by nature for a good
purpose? They usually talk in this manner. In the first place, they say
much in praise of anger; they call it the whetstone of courage, and