Quitting the field; urged on by rising rage,
Forced the declining troops again t'engage.

Shall we say, then, that madness has its use?

XXIV. Examine the definitions of courage: you will find it does not
require the assistance of passion. Courage is, then, an affection of
mind that endures all things, being itself in proper subjection to the
highest of all laws; or it may be called a firm maintenance of judgment
in supporting or repelling everything that has a formidable appearance,
or a knowledge of what is formidable or otherwise, and maintaining
invariably a stable judgment of all such things, so as to bear them or
despise them; or, in fewer words, according to Chrysippus (for the
above definitions are Sphærus's, a man of the first ability as a
layer-down of definitions, as the Stoics think. But they are all pretty
much alike: they give us only common notions, some one way, and some
another). But what is Chrysippus's definition? Fortitude, says he, is
the knowledge of all things that are bearable, or an affection of the
mind which bears and supports everything in obedience to the chief law
of reason without fear. Now, though we should attack these men in the
same manner as Carneades used to do, I fear they are the only real
philosophers; for which of these definitions is there which does not
explain that obscure and intricate notion of courage which every man
conceives within himself? And when it is thus explained, what can a
warrior, a commander, or an orator want more? And no one can think that
they will be unable to behave themselves courageously without anger.
What! do not even the Stoics, who maintain that all fools are mad, make
the same inferences? for, take away perturbations, especially a
hastiness of temper, and they will appear to talk very absurdly. But
what they assert is this: they say that all fools are mad, as all