starts Epicurus, who, with submission to the Gods, thinks a wise man
always happy. He is much charmed with the dignity of this opinion, but
he never would have owned that, had he attended to himself; for what is
there more inconsistent than for one who could say that pain was the
greatest or the only evil to think also that a wise man can possibly
say in the midst of his torture, How sweet is this! We are not,
therefore, to form our judgment of philosophers from detached
sentences, but from their consistency with themselves, and their
ordinary manner of talking.

XI. _A._ You compel me to be of your opinion; but have a care that you
are not inconsistent yourself.

_M._ In what respect?

_A._ Because I have lately read your fourth book on Good and Evil: and
in that you appeared to me, while disputing against Cato, to be
endeavoring to show, which in my opinion means to prove, that Zeno and
the Peripatetics differ only about some new words; but if we allow
that, what reason can there be, if it follows from the arguments of
Zeno that virtue contains all that is necessary to a happy life, that
the Peripatetics should not be at liberty to say the same? For, in my
opinion, regard should be had to the thing, not to words.

_M._ What! you would convict me from my own words, and bring against me
what I had said or written elsewhere. You may act in that manner with
those who dispute by established rules. We live from hand to mouth, and
say anything that strikes our mind with probability, so that we are the
only people who are really at liberty. But, since I just now spoke of
consistency, I do not think the inquiry in this place is, if the