if he shall prove to have refrained from such slaughter, he pays
the penalty at the hands of his commander. Shall we not go so far
as to call these laws unjust or rather no laws at all? For that
which was not just does not seem to me to be a law.

_Idem, on Exodus ch. xxvii:_ The Israelites committed no theft in
spoiling the Egyptians, but rendered a service to God at his
bidding, just as when the servant of a judge kills a man whom the
law hath ordered to be killed; certainly if he does it of his own
volition he is a homicide, even though he knows that the man whom
he executes ought to be executed by the judge.

_Idem, on Leviticus ch. lxxv:_ When a man is justly put to death,
the law puts him to death, not thou.

_Idem, Bk. I of the "City of God":_ Thou shall not kill, except
in the case of those whose death God orders, or else when a law
hath been passed to suit the needs of the time and express
command hath been laid upon a person. But he does not kill who
owes service to the person who gives him his orders, for he is
as it were a mere sword for the person who employs his
assistance.

_Likewise:_ When a soldier, in obedience to the power under which
he is legitimately placed, kills a man, by no law of the state is
he accused of murder; nay if he has not done it, he is accused of
desertion and insubordination. But if he had acted under his own
initiative and of his own will, he would have incurred the charge
of shedding human blood. And so he is punished if he does not do
when ordered that for which he would receive punishment if he did