there is no defensive. This is generally true for tactics, but even so not
universally true. Defensive tactical positions are possible at sea, as in
defended anchorages. These were always a reality, and the mine has
increased their possibilities. In the latest developments of naval warfare
we have seen the Japanese at the Elliot Islands preparing a real defensive
position to cover the landing of their Second Army in the Liaotung
Peninsula. Strategically the proposition is not true at all. A strategical
defensive has been quite as common at sea as on land, and our own gravest
problems have often been how to break down such an attitude when our enemy
assumed it. It usually meant that the enemy remained in his own waters and
near his own bases, where it was almost impossible for us to attack him
with decisive result, and whence he always threatened us with counterattack
at moments of exhaustion, as the Dutch did at Sole Bay and in the Medway.
The difficulty of dealing decisively with an enemy who adopted this course
was realised by our service very early, and from first to last one of our
chief preoccupations was to prevent the enemy availing himself of this
device and to force him to fight in the open, or at least to get between
him and his base and force an action there.

Probably the most remarkable manifestation of the advantages that may be
derived in suitable conditions from a strategical defensive is also to be
found in the late Russo-Japanese War. In the final crisis of the naval
struggle the Japanese fleet was able to take advantage of a defensive
attitude in its own waters which the Russian Baltic fleet would have to
break down to attain its end, and the result was the most decisive naval
victory ever recorded.

The deterrent power of active and dexterous operations from such a position
was well known to our old tradition. The device was used several times,
particularly in our home waters, to prevent a fleet, which for the time we