defence we may leave the subject for the present. It is possible of course
to catalogue the advantages and disadvantages of each form, but any such
bald statement--without concrete examples to explain the meaning--must
always appear controversial and is apt to mislead. It is better to reserve
their fuller consideration till we come to deal with strategical operations
and are able to note their actual effect upon the conduct of war in its
various forms. Leaving therefore our first classification of wars into
offensive and defensive we will pass on to the second, which is the only
one of real practical importance.

* * * * *

CHAPTER THREE

NATURES OF WARS--
LIMITED AND UNLIMITED

* * * * *

The second classification to which we are led by the political theory of
war, is one which Clausewitz was the first to formulate and one to which he
came to attach the highest importance. It becomes necessary therefore to
examine his views in some detail--not because there is any need to regard a
continental soldier, however distinguished, as an indispensable authority
for a maritime nation. The reason is quite the reverse. It is because a
careful examination of his doctrine on this point will lay open what are
the radical and essential differences between the German or Continental
School of Strategy and the British or Maritime School--that is, our own
traditional School, which too many writers both at home and abroad quietly
assume to have no existence. The evil tendency of that assumption cannot be