Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Julian S. (Julian Stafford) Corbett
page 35 of 333 (10%)
page 35 of 333 (10%)
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policy to spend that vigour, a point at which, long before your force was
exhausted or even fully developed, it would be wiser to abandon your object rather than to spend more upon it. This distinction it is very necessary to grasp quite clearly, for it is often superficially confused with the distinction already referred to, which Clausewitz drew in the earlier part of his work--that is, the distinction between what he called the character of modern war and the character of the wars which preceded the Napoleonic era. It will be remembered he insisted that the wars of his own time had been wars between armed nations with a tendency to throw the whole weight of the nation into the fighting line, whereas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries wars were waged by standing armies and not by the whole nation in arms. The distinction of course is real and of far-reaching consequences, but it has no relation to the distinction between "Limited" and "Unlimited" war. War may be waged on the Napoleonic system either for a limited or an unlimited object. A modern instance will serve to clear the field. The recent Russo-Japanese War was fought for a limited object--the assertion of certain claims over territory which formed no part of the possessions of either belligerent. Hostilities were conducted on entirely modern lines by two armed nations and not by standing armies alone. But in the case of one belligerent her interest in the object was so limited as to cause her to abandon it long before her whole force as an armed nation was exhausted or even put forth. The expense of life and treasure which the struggle was involving was beyond what the object was worth. This second distinction--that is, between Limited and Unlimited wars--Clausewitz regarded as of greater importance than his previous one |
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