Finally, it has to be noted that even permanent general command can never
in practice be absolute. No degree of naval superiority can ensure our
communications against sporadic attack from detached cruisers, or even
raiding squadrons if they be boldly led and are prepared to risk
destruction. Even after Hawke's decisive victory at Quiberon had completed
the overthrow of the enemy's sea forces, a British transport was captured
between Cork and Portsmouth, and an Indiaman in sight of the Lizard, while
Wellington's complaints in the Peninsula of the insecurity of his
communications are well known.[9] By general and permanent control we do
not mean that the enemy can do nothing, but that he cannot interfere with
our maritime trade and oversea operations so seriously as to affect the
issue of the war, and that he cannot carry on his own trade and operations
except at such risk and hazard as to remove them from the field of
practical strategy. In other words, it means that the enemy can no longer
attack our lines of passage and communication effectively, and that he
cannot use or defend his own.

[9] In justice to Wellington, it should be said that his complaints were
due to false reports that exaggerated a couple of insignificant captures
into a serious interruption.

To complete our equipment for appreciating any situation for which
operations have to be designed, it is necessary to remember that when the
command is in dispute the general conditions may give a stable or an
unstable equilibrium. It may be that the power of neither side
preponderates to any appreciable extent. It may also be that the
preponderance is with ourselves, or it may be that it lies with the enemy.
Such preponderance of course will not depend entirely on actual relative
strength, either physical or moral, but will be influenced by the