us, and is thus debarred from knowing more than the _outsides_ of
things; (2) that its typical achievement is therefore geometry, and
geometry, _because it can measure only straight lines_, necessarily
misconceives the true character of 'real duration'. Now, as to the first
point, I should have thought it obvious that the establishment of a
_modus vivendi_ with one's fellows has always been as much of a
practical need as the avoidance of stones and pit-falls, and the alleged
conclusion about the defects of the intellect does not therefore seem to
me to follow from M. Bergson's premisses, even if we had any reason, as
I do not see that we have, to accept the premisses. And as to the second
point, I would ask whether M. Bergson possesses a clock or a watch, and
if he has, how he supposes time is measured on them? He seems to me to
have forgotten the elementary fact that angles can be measured as well
as straight lines. (I might add that he makes the further curious
assumption that all geometry is metrical.) It may be that something
would be left of the Bergsonian philosophy if one eliminated the
consequences of these initial blunders, but I do not know what the
remainder would be. At any rate, the anti-intellectualism which M.
Bergson and his disciple, Professor Carr, seem to regard as fundamental
will have to go, unless different and better grounds can be found for
it. I must leave it to others to judge of the adequacy of this apology.


FOR REFERENCE

Varisco, _The Great Problem_ (Macmillan).

Varisco, _Know Thyself_ (Macmillan).

Aliotta, _The Idealistic Reaction against Science_ (Macmillan).