of the other Powers, including the United States of America, were
induced to add their weight of persuasion in urging upon the Transvaal
the adoption of the measures demanded by England for correcting the
existing trouble. It may be urged that the display of force in sending
the first batches of troops would have afforded grounds for
exasperation, and be construed by the Transvaal as a menace and actual
hostility, tending to precipitate a conflict which it was so earnestly
intended to avoid. To this may be replied that the 20,000 men sent in
August were readily viewed as placing the hitherto undermanned Colonial
garrisons upon an appropriate peace effective only; but not so with
respect to the army corps of 50,000 men despatched in September--this
was felt as an intended restraint against "Bond" projects, to enforce
the observance of any agreement which the Transvaal might for the nonce
assent to, and above all it was tending, unless at once opposed by the
Bond, to weaken its ranks by producing hesitation and ultimate defection
from that body; the die was thus to be cast, duplicity appeared to be
played out--the ultimatum of 9th October was the outcome; and England,
though unprepared, could not possibly accept it otherwise than as a
wilful challenge to war.

As the pursuit of our study will show, the success of Mr. Chamberlain's
diplomacy to avert war depended upon the very slender prospects that the
Transvaal Government might have been induced to waver, and finally to
break with the Afrikaner Bond--a forlorn hope indeed, considering the
perfection which that formidable organization had reached. Its cherished
objects were not meant to be abandoned. The advice of "Bond" leaders
prevailed. War was declared and the Rubicon crossed in enthusiastic
expectations of soon realizing the long-deferred Bond motto: "The
expulsion of the hateful English."