repulsed a large Boer force, probably the main northern column. On
Sunday also the attack seems to have been renewed, this time apparently
by two columns, one of which may have been composed of Free State troops
from Muller's Pass. Either on Sunday or Monday General Yule determined
to withdraw from a position in which he could hardly hope without
destruction to resist the overwhelming numbers brought to bear against
him, especially as the Boer forces, either from the direction of
Muller's Pass or from Bester's Station, were threatening his line of
retreat by the Glencoe-Ladysmith road. Accordingly, leaving in hospital
at Dundee those of his wounded who could not be moved, he retired along
the Helpmakaar road, which he followed as far as Beith, about fourteen
miles from Dundee, and near there he bivouacked on Monday night. On
Tuesday he continued his march from Beith towards Ladysmith, expecting
to reach Sunday's River, about sixteen miles, by dark. Sir George White,
informed of this movement and of the presence of a strong Boer force to
the west of the Ladysmith-Glencoe road, set out on Tuesday morning to
interpose between this force and General Yule, and by delivering a smart
attack at Reitfontein was able for that day to cover the retreat of
General Yule's brigade.

The Boer Commander-in-Chief has thus, apparently, failed in his attempt
to crush one wing of the British force, and has accomplished no more
than bringing about its return to the main body, which must have been a
part of the original British plan, unless it was thought that a British
brigade was capable of defeating four times its own number of Boers.

The net result hitherto seems to be that the Boers have had the
strategical and the British the tactical advantage. The British troops
have proved their superiority; the Boers have shown that even against
troops of better training, spirit, and discipline, numbers must tell,