thousand already there during a five weeks' campaign.

After reconnaissance on Friday and Saturday (October 27th-8th) Sir
George White, finding a large Boer force in front of him at Ladysmith,
determined to hit out on Monday. Suppose Ladysmith to be the centre of a
compass card, the Boers were spread across the radii from N. to E. Sir
George meaning to clear the Boers from a position near N.E. prepared to
move forward towards N.E. and towards E., sending in each direction
about a brigade of infantry and a brigade division of field artillery.
He sent two battalions and a mounted battery towards N. The party sent
to N. started after dark on Sunday; the other parties, making ready in
the night, set forward at dawn. There was no enemy in position at N.E.
The force sent towards E. pushed back a Boer force, which retreated only
to enable a second Boer force to take the British E. column in
flank--apparently its left flank. The N.E. column had to be brought up
to cover the retirement of the E. column. When these two columns
returned to Ladysmith the N. column was still out. Long after dark Sir
George White learned that the N. column, which had lost its battery and
its reserve rifle ammunition by a stampede of the mules, had been
surrounded by a far stronger Boer force, had held its ground until the
last cartridge was gone, and that then the survivors had accepted
quarter and surrendered.

Sir George White manfully takes upon himself the blame for this
misfortune. His portentous blunders were in sending out the party to a
distance and in taking no steps to keep in communication with it or to
support it. The detachment of a small party to a distant point is a
habit of Indian warfare. It is out of place against an enemy of European
race, for the detachment is sure to be destroyed if the enemy has a
capable commander. Every man in the Ladysmith force will have felt on