various Natal levies. His interest is to delay battle until all his
force has come up. The advanced troops seem to be spread along the line
from Mooi River to Estcourt, and the Boer forces are facing them on a
long line to the east of the railway from a point beyond Estcourt to a
point below Mooi River. The Boers are on the flank from which their
attack would be most dangerous, and seem to aim at interposing between
the parts of Sir C.F. Clery's force, and at a convergent attack in
superior strength upon his advance guard at Estcourt.

I should have expected the advance parties of Sir C.F. Clery's force to
have fallen back as the Boers approached. The attempt to keep up the
connection between the parts of a concentrating force by means of the
railway strikes me as very dangerous from the moment that the enemy is
in the neighbourhood. The important thing for Sir C.F. Clery is not
whether his battle takes place twenty miles nearer to Ladysmith or
twenty miles farther away, but that it should be an unmistakable
victory, so that after it the Boer force engaged should be unable to
offer any further serious hindrance to his advance. To gain an end of
this kind a general should not merely bring up all the troops from the
rear, falling back for them if necessary, but should take care that none
can be cut off by the enemy in his front. A decisive victory by Sir C.F.
Clery or by Sir Redvers Duller, who may feel this action to be so
important as to justify his presence, would leave no doubt as to the
issue of the war. An indecisive battle would postpone indefinitely the
relief of Ladysmith and leave the future of the campaign in suspense.
Defeat would be disastrous, for it would probably involve the ultimate
loss of Sir George White's force. For these reasons I regard the battle
shortly to be fought in Natal as the first decisive action of the war,
and am astonished that a larger proportion of Sir Redvers Buller's force
has not been sent to take part in it.