_November 29th_, 1899

Two factors in the present war were impressed upon my mind at the
beginning: first, that the British Army was never in better condition as
regards the zeal and skill of its officers, the training and discipline
of the men, and the organisation of the field services; secondly, that
the Government had deliberately handicapped that Army by giving the
Boers many weeks' clear start in which to try with their whole forces to
overwhelm the small British parties sent out at haphazard to delay them.
The whole course of events up to now has been underlining these two
judgments. The British troops gave proof of their qualities at Talana
Hill, at Elandslaagte, and on the trying retreat from Dundee. There is
no more difficult task in war than a frontal attack upon a position
defended by the repeating rifle. Good judges have over and over again
pronounced it impossible. But the British troops have done it again and
again. General Hildyard's attack on Beacon Hill, an arduous action for a
definite purpose which was effected--the re-opening of the railway from
Estcourt towards the south--was a creditable achievement on the Natal
side. On the Cape side Lord Methuen's advance from Orange River is an
example of the greatest determination and energy coupled with caution on
the part of the general, and of the most brilliant courage on the part
of the troops. I thought it probable that so skilful a tactician as Lord
Methuen would combine flank with frontal attacks. It seems that the
conditions gave him little or no opportunity to do that, and he has had
three times to assault and drive back a well-posted enemy. At Belmont,
on the 23rd, and at Enslin, on the 25th, Lord Methuen had a numerical
superiority large enough to justify an attack in which heavy loss was to
be expected. The losses were not exceptionally great, and this fact
proves that the British troops are of very much higher quality than
their adversaries. At Modder River, on the 28th, the numbers were