imperfect information. It was regarded as certain so long ago as
December last, by those in a position to give the best forecast, that
the Boers of both States meant war with the object of establishing Boer
supremacy. The Cabinet, therefore, has knowingly and deliberately taken
upon itself the responsibility for whatever risks are now run. In this
deliberate decision of the Cabinet lies the best ground for hoping that
the risks are not so great as they seem.

The two Boer Republics are well supplied with money, arms, and
ammunition, and I believe have collected large stores of supplies. Their
armies consist of their burghers, with a small nucleus of professional
artillery, officers, and men. The total number of burghers of both
States is about fifty thousand, and that number is swollen by the
addition of non-British Uitlanders who have been induced to take arms by
the offer of burghership. The two States are bound by treaty to stand or
fall together, and the treaty gives the Commander-in-Chief of both
armies to the Transvaal Commander-in-Chief, who is however, bound to
consult his subordinate colleague of the Orange Free State. The whole of
the fifty thousand burghers cannot take the field. Some must remain to
watch the native population, which far outnumbers the burghers and is
not well affected. Some must be kept to watch the Basutos, who are
anxious to raid the Free State, and there will be deductions for sick
and absentees as well as for the necessary duties of civil
administration. The forts of Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Bloemfontein
require permanent garrisons. In the absence of the accurate data
obtainable in the case of an army regularly organised into tactical and
administrative units, the most various estimates are current of the
force that the two States can put into the field as a mobile army
available for attack as well as for defence. I think thirty-five
thousand men a safer estimate than twenty-five thousand. The Boers are