Ladysmith ought never to have been besieged. On October 30 we should
have made use of our advantage. If we had at once followed the enemy
when they fled in disorder, we should in all probability easily have
taken those positions that would have involved the immediate surrender
of Ladysmith. Many lives would have been sacrificed, but not so many as
were sacrificed during the whole siege. And we might have used those men
who were necessary to maintain the siege elsewhere as an attacking
force. Instead of following up our advantage, we deliberately prepared
for a siege. The enemy meanwhile made use of the opportunity to entrench
themselves well. Most of our burghers were against our attempting to
take the town by assault when once it was thoroughly entrenched.

The Pretoria town commando and that from Krokodil River in the Pretoria
district occupied the position nearest to Ladysmith. This was a hill to
the north of the town, flat at the top, and surrounded by a stone wall.
In all probability the enclosed depression of about 500 paces in circuit
had been used as a cattle-kraal. Against that kopje (hill) we gradually
put up our tents. From our camp we looked on to a large flat mountain
that we called Little Amajuba, because on October 30 the first large
capture of prisoners had been made there. In front of our kopje, near
the foot, ran a donga, and at a distance of about 1,000 paces, parallel
to us, lay another oblong kopje occupied by the enemy. This kopje we
called Rooirandjes.

On November 8 we received the order from our General to attack the
Rooirandjes the following day. We were about 250 strong, and very
willing, as that position had not yet been entrenched. On a mountain to
our right a cannon had been placed that was to begin firing on the
enemy's position towards dawn. Distinct orders were given that our
Veld-Cornet was to be at the foot of Rooirandjes with his men before