At Commandonek we rested a few hours while De Wet himself went to
reconnoitre. He sent a message to the English officer in charge of the
pass that he must surrender. The officer replied that he did not quite
understand _who_ must surrender--he or De Wet. I think this was merely a
dodge on De Wet's part to find out by the signature of the reply who
was in charge of the army at the pass, and so to make a guess at the
numbers of the enemy.

He decided not to attack the pass, and before daybreak next day we were
on the move again. Some time afterwards at Warmbad I heard that an
English General had related this dodge of De Wet's, but he thought De
Wet had threatened him with a very small force, as his commando must
still have been at Olifantsnek. It is an example of the way we misled
the enemy by our mobility.




VII

WITH PRESIDENT STEYN TO PRESIDENT KRUGER


Near Krokodil River, on Carlyle's Farm, President Steyn and his
attendants separated from De Wet's commando, and went in the direction
of Zoutpan to Machadodorp. We were about seventy-five men in all. The
little commando consisted of carts, a few trolleys, and horsemen on
strong, well-conditioned horses. The Free Staters nearly all had one or
two spare horses. Our own commando still always consisted of twelve or
thirteen men, and the small ambulance waggon which we used for