retreat hurriedly so as not to be cut off by the wedge that was forcing
its way along the mountains into the camp. They were far beyond reach of
our bullets. Where De la Rey's cannon were, and why they did not make
themselves heard, I do not know. Neither do I know why General Smuts did
not cut off the retreat of the enemy to the south-east. They had placed
a few cannon to our left in the valley, and bombarded us fiercely on the
mountain without much result. The balls of a small Maxim flew past us
with a hissing sound and hindered us in our aim.

The waggons that were inspanned fled in the direction of Commandonek,
and halted in the valley at a respectful distance from us. Although the
camp appeared to be almost deserted, a continual firing was heard below
us. I could not make out from where it came until I suddenly discovered
several small troops of horsemen who galloped at intervals from behind a
wall in the shade of some trees. They were in all probability left
there as cover for the waggons. The few shots we fired at them missed
their aim. We saw De la Rey's burghers capture a large herd of cattle.

While Malherbe and I were peering from behind our hurriedly erected
entrenchment, and occasionally firing a few shots, I discovered four or
five brave khakies busy dragging along an ammunition waggon, or a gun;
from such a distance we could not distinguish which. We fired at them
with a sight of 800 paces, but did not hit them, as the horizontal
distance to the camp was not more than 400 paces, and we should have
used a sight of 600 paces, but the height of the mountain was very
misleading. Immediately afterwards a span of mules came in the direction
of the supposed gun, so Malherbe and I retreated as fast as we could, to
find a better cover more to the left. It is strange how in a battle one
always has an idea that all the threatened danger is aimed specially at
one's self.