was conducted in the most admirable manner, and closed the campaign of
1812.

The foregoing is necessarily a most meagre outline of events, on which
volumes have been written. Those who may be anxious to read the Duke of
Wellington's own account of the military operations, will find in the
public despatches his annual summaries: for 1809, in despatch No. 343;
for 1810, No. 504; and for 1811, No. 615. For 1812 there is no such
summary.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the difficulties with
which the Duke of Wellington had to contend during these the three first
years of his service in Spain, were confined to the making of military
dispositions and the winning of battles. Other causes there were,
operating as a drawback at every forward step, and obstacles sufficient
to have wearied a less stout heart or a less determined spirit. To
oppose to a skillful and veteran enemy he had but an inadequate force,
most scantily supplied with provisions, and even with money. The French
generals, restrained by no principle of honour or even of policy, were
accustomed to plunder mercilessly for the subsistence of their troops:
the English commander would take nothing from the people but what was
paid for on the spot in money or in bills on the English government.
Yet, such was the apathy (or worse) of the Portuguese authorities, that
even on these terms provisions were not forthcoming; and important
operations were constantly delayed or frustrated by the want of the
necessary subsistence for the troops.

The reader of the Duke's despatches will glean much of his character
from the letters written from time to time to these persons; and,
scattered through the extracts which form a part of this volume, will be