as christians; and that therefore, in determining the propriety of a
practice, they will frequently judge of it by an estimate, very
different from that of the world.

The Quakers do not deny that instrumental music is capable of exciting
delight. They are not insensible either of its power or of its charms.
They throw no imputation on its innocence, when viewed abstractly by
itself; but they do not see anything in it sufficiently useful, to make
it an object of education, or so useful, as to counterbalance other
considerations, which make for its disuse.

The Quakers would think it wrong to indulge in their families the usual
motives for the acquisition of this science. Self-gratification, which
is one of them, and reputation in the world, which is the other, are not
allowable in the Christian system. Add to which that where there is a
desire for such reputation, an emulative disposition is generally
cherished, and envy and vain glory are often excited in the pursuit.

They are of opinion also, that the learning of this art does not tend to
promote the most important object of education, the improvement of the
mind. When a person is taught the use of letters, he is put into the way
of acquiring natural, historical, religious, and other branches of
knowledge, and of course of improving his intellectual and moral
character. But music has no pretensions, in the opinion of the Quakers,
to the production of such an end. Polybius, indeed relates, that he
could give no solid reason, why one tribe of the Arcadians should have
been so civilized, and the others so barbarous, but that the former were
fond, and the latter were ignorant of music. But the Quakers would
argue, that if music had any effect in the civilization, this effect
would be seen in the manners, and not in the morals of mankind. Musical