It may have been observed by some of my readers, that though the Quakers
have adduced arguments, which may be considered as fair and positive on
the subjects, which have come before us, yet they appear to have adduced
one, which is no other, than that of condemning the use of a thing on
account of its abuse. Now this mode of reasoning, it will be said has
been exploded by logicians, and for this, among other reasons, that if
we were bound to relinquish customs in consequence of it, we should be
obliged to give up many things that are connected with the comforts, and
even with the existence of our lives.

To this observation I must reply, that the Quakers never recommend an
abstinence from any custom, merely because the use of it may lead to its
abuse.

Where a custom is simply liable to abuse, they satisfy themselves with
recommending moderation in the use of it.

But where the abuse of a custom is either, in the first place,
necessarily, or, in the second very generally connected with the use of
it, they generally consider the omission of it as morally wise and
prudent. It is in these two cases only that they apply, or that they lay
any stress upon the species of argument described.

This species of argument, under these two limitations, they believe to
be tenable in christian morals, and they entertain this belief upon the
following grounds.

It may be laid down as a position, that the abuse of any custom which is
innocent in itself, is an evil, and that it may become a moral evil. And
they conceive it to become a moral evil in the eye of christianity, when