"Duke William had undertaken his expedition not as a mere feudal
lord of the barons of Normandy but rather as the managing director
of a great joint-stock company for the conquest of England, in
which not only his own subjects but hundreds of adventurers, poor
and rich, from all parts of Western Europe had taken shares."

The Normans, then, came to Ireland with their eyes on three objects. In
the first place, property. This was to be secured in the case of each
individual adventurer by the overthrow of some individual Irish
chieftain. It necessitated war in the shape of a purely local, and
indeed personal grapple. In the second place, plunder. This was to be
secured by raids, incursions, and temporary alliances. In the third
place, escape from the growing power and exactions of the Crown. This
was to be secured geographically by migration to Ireland, and
politically by delaying, resolutely if discreetly, the extension in that
country of the over-lordship of the King. Herein lies the explanation of
the fact that for three and a half centuries the English penetration
into Ireland is a mere chaos of private appetites and egotisms. The
invaders, as we have said, were specialists in war, and in the
unification of states through war. This they had done for England; this
they failed to do for Ireland. The one ingredient which, if dropped into
the seething cauldron of her life, must have produced the definite
crystallisation of a new nationality, complete in structure and
function, was not contributed. True, the Cymro-Franks proved themselves
strong enough in arms to maintain their foothold; if that physical test
is enough to establish their racial superiority then let us salute Mr
Jack Johnson as Zarathustra, the superman. But in their one special and
characteristic task they failed lamentably. Instead of conquest and
consolidation they gave us mere invasion and disturbance. The disastrous
role played by them has been unfolded by many interpreters of history,