penned this expression, matters not. They will neither qualify the
sentiment, nor add to its defect. If right, it needs no apology; if
wrong, it merits no excuse. It is sent to the world as an opinion of
philosophy, and may be examined without regard to the author.

It seems to be a defect, connected with ingenuity, that it often
employs itself more in matters of curiosity than usefulness. Man must
be the privy councillor of fate, or something is not right. He must
know the springs, the whys, and wherefores of every thing, or he sits
down unsatisfied. Whether this be a crime, or only a caprice of
humanity, I am not enquiring into. I shall take the passage as I find
it, and place my objections against it.

It is not so properly the _motives_ which _produced_ the alliance, as
the _consequences_ which are to be _produced from it_, that mark out
the field of philosophical reflection. In the one we only penetrate
into the barren cave of secrecy, where little can be known, and every
thing may be misconceived; in the other, the mind is presented with a
wide extended prospect, of vegetative good, and sees a thousand
blessings budding into existence.

But the expression, even within the compass of the Abbe's meaning,
sets out with an error, because it is made to declare that, which no
man has authority to declare. Who can say that the happiness of
mankind made _no part of the motives_ which produced the alliance? To
be able to declare this, a man must be possessed of the mind of all
the parties concerned, and know that their motives were something
else.

In proportion as the independence of America became contemplated and