leave them, unless they become madmen. While the constitution continues
to be read, and its principle known, the States must, by every rational
man, be considered as essential, component parts of The Union; and
therefore the idea of sacrificing the former to the latter is wholly
inadmissible.

The objectors do not advert to the natural strength and resources of
State governments, which will ever give them an important superiority
over the general government. If we compare the nature of their different
powers, or the means of popular influence which each possesses, we shall
find the advantage entirely on the side of the States. This
consideration, important as it is, seems to have been little attended
to. The aggregate number of representatives throughout the States may be
two thousand. Their personal influence will, therefore, be
proportionably more extensive than that of one or two hundred men in
Congress. The State establishments of civil and military officers of
every description, infinitely surpassing in number any possible
correspondent establishments in the general government, will create such
an extent and complication of attachments, as will ever secure the
predilection and support of the people. Whenever, therefore, Congress
shall meditate any infringement of the State constitutions, the great
body of the people will naturally take part with their domestic
representatives. Can the general government withstand such an united
opposition? Will the people suffer themselves to be stripped of their
privileges? Will they suffer their Legislatures to be reduced to a
shadow and a name? The idea is shocking to common-sense.

From the circumstances already explained, and many others which might be
mentioned, results a complicated, irresistible check, which must ever
support the existence and importance of the State governments. The