into such a treaty. The question of expediency, therefore, assumes
before us a different and more complex shape than when before the
negotiator, the Senate, or the President. The treaty, in itself and
abstractedly considered, may be injurious; it may be such an instrument
as in the opinion of the House ought not to have been adopted by the
Executive; and yet such as it is we may think it expedient under the
present circumstances to carry it into effect. I will therefore first
take a view of the provisions of the treaty itself, and in the next
place, supposing it is injurious, consider, in case it is not carried
into effect, what will be the natural consequences of such refusal.

The provisions of the treaty relate either to the adjustment of past
differences, or to the future intercourse of the two nations. The
differences now existing between Great Britain and this country arose
either from non-execution of some articles of the treaty of peace or
from the effects of the present European war. The complaints of Great
Britain in relation to the treaty of 1783 were confined to the legal
impediments thrown by the several States in the way of the recovery of
British debts. The late treaty provides adequate remedy on that subject;
the United States are bound to make full and complete compensation for
any losses arising from that source, and every ground of complaint on
the part of Great Britain is removed.

Having thus done full justice to the other nation, America has a right
to expect that equal attention shall be paid to her claims arising from
infractions of the treaty of peace, viz., compensation for the negroes
carried away by the British; restoration of the western posts, and
indemnification for their detention.

On the subject of the first claim, which has been objected to as