making part of that treaty. Unless we can obtain security for our
navigation, we want no treaty; and the only provision which can give us
that security, should have been the _sine qua non_ of a treaty. On the
contrary, we have disgusted all the other neutral nations of Europe,
without whose concert and assistance there is but little hope that we
shall ever obtain that point; and we have taught Great Britain that we
are disposed to form the most intimate connections with her, even at the
expense of recognizing a principle the most fatal to the liberty of
commerce and to the security of our navigation.

But, if we could not obtain anything which might secure us against
future aggressions, should we have parted, without receiving any
equivalent, with those weapons of self-defence, which, although they
could not repel, might, in some degree, prevent any gross attacks upon
our trade--any gross violation of our rights as a neutral nation? We
have no fleet to oppose or to punish the insults of Great Britain; but,
from our commercial relative situation, we have it in our power to
restrain her aggressions, by restrictions on her trade, by a total
prohibition of her manufactures, or by a sequestration of the debts due
to her. By the treaty, not satisfied with receiving nothing, not
satisfied with obtaining no security for the future, we have, of our own
accord, surrendered those defensive arms, for fear they might be abused
by ourselves. We have given up the two first, for the whole time during
which we might want them most, the period of the present war; and the
last, the power of sequestration, we have abandoned for ever: every
other article of the treaty of commerce is temporary; this perpetual.

I shall not enter into a discussion of the immorality of sequestering
private property. What can be more immoral than war; or plundering on
the high seas, legalized under the name of privateering? Yet