the advantages which in my opinion would result to the United States
from the non-existence of that instrument; I will not repeat, but
proceed at once to examine what losses may accrue that can be set off
against those advantages.

The further detention of the posts, the national stain that will result
from receiving no reparation for the spoliations on our trade, and the
uncertainty of a final adjustment of our differences with Great Britain,
are the three evils which strike me as resulting from a rejection of the
treaty; and when to those considerations I add that of the present
situation of this country, of the agitation of the public mind, and of
the advantages that will arise from union of sentiments, however
injurious and unequal I conceive the treaty to be, however repugnant it
may be to my feelings, and perhaps to my prejudices, I feel induced to
vote for it, and will not give my assent to any proposition which will
imply its rejection. But the conduct of Great Britain since the treaty
was signed, the impressment of our seamen, and their uninterrupted
spoliations on our trade, especially by seizing our vessels laden with
provisions, a proceeding which they may perhaps justify by one of the
articles of the treaty, are such circumstances as may induce us to pause
awhile, in order to examine whether it is proper, immediately and
without having obtained any explanation thereon, to adopt the resolution
on the table, and to pass, at present, all the laws necessary to carry
the treaty into effect.

Whatever evils may follow a rejection of the treaty, they will not
attend a postponement. To suspend our proceedings will not throw us into
a situation which will require new negotiations, new arrangements on the
points already settled and well understood by both parties. It will be
merely a delay, until an explanation of the late conduct of the British