truth of the writing; but it was from the first apprehended, and it
seems now to be adjudged (the doctrine has certainly been asserted on
this floor), that matters of opinion, arising on notorious facts, come
under the law. If this is the case, where is the advantage of the law
requiring that the writing should be false before a man shall be liable
to punishment, or of his having the liberty of proving the truth of his
writing? Of the truth of facts there is an almost certain test; the
belief of honest men is certain enough to entitle it to great
confidence; but their opinions have no certainty at all. The trial of
the truth of opinions, in the best state of society, would be altogether
precarious; and perhaps a jury of twelve men could never be found to
agree in any one opinion. At the present moment, when, unfortunately,
opinion is almost entirely governed by prejudice and passion, it may be
more decided, but nobody will say it is more respectable. Chance must
determine whether political opinions are true or false, and it will not
unfrequently happen that a man will be punished for publishing opinions
which are sincerely his, and which are of a nature to be extremely
interesting to the public, merely because accident or design has
collected a jury of different sentiments.

Is the power claimed proper for Congress to possess? It is believed not,
and this will readily be admitted if it can be proved, as I think it
can, that the persons who administer the government have an interest in
the power to be confided opposed to that of the community. It must be
agreed that the nature of our government makes a diffusion of knowledge
of public affairs necessary and proper, and that the people have no mode
of obtaining it but through the press. The necessity for their having
this information results from its being their duty to elect all the
parts of the Government, and, in this way, to sit in judgment over the
conduct of those who have been heretofore employed. The most important