electors, as seven free persons in any of the States in which slavery
does not exist.

This inequality in the apportionment of representatives was not
misunderstood at the adoption of the Constitution, but no one
anticipated the fact that the whole of the revenue of the United States
would be derived from indirect taxes (which cannot be supposed to
spread themselves over the several States according to the rule for the
apportionment of direct taxes), but it was believed that a part of
the contribution to the common treasury would be apportioned among the
States by the rule for the apportionment of representatives. The States
in which slavery is prohibited, ultimately, though with reluctance,
acquiesced in the disproportionate number of representatives and
electors that was secured to the slaveholding States. The concession
was, at the time, believed to be a great one, and has proved to
have been the greatest which was made to secure the adoption of the
Constitution.

Great, however, as this concession was, it was definite, and its full
extent was comprehended. It was a settlement between the original
thirteen States. The considerations arising out of their actual
condition, their past connection, and the obligation which all felt to
promote a reformation in the Federal Government, were peculiar to the
time and to the parties, and are not applicable to the new States, which
Congress may now be willing to admit into the Union.

The equality of rights, which includes an equality of burdens, is
a vital principle in our theory of government, and its jealous
preservation is the best security of public and individual freedom;
the departure from this principle in the disproportionate power and