not--came in without that stipulation, and they were left free to tax
the public lands the moment when they were sold. Here was a principle;
as much a principle as it is contended was established in the Utah and
New Mexico territorial bill; but did any one suppose that it acted upon
the other Territories? I believe the whole system is now abolished under
the operation of general laws, and the influence of that example may
have led to the change. But, until it was made by legislation, the mere
fact that public lands sold in Arkansas were immediately subject to
taxation, could not alter the law in regard to the public lands sold in
Missouri, or in any other to where they were they were exempt.

There is a case equally analogous to the very matter we are now
considering--the prohibition or permission of slavery. The ordinance of
1787 prohibited slavery in the territory northwest of the Ohio. In 1790
Congress passed an act accepting the cession which the State of North
Carolina had made of the western part of her territory, with the
proviso, that in reference to the territory thus ceded Congress should
pass no laws "tending to the emancipation of the slaves." Here was a
precisely parallel case. Here was a territory in which, in 1787, slavery
was prohibited. Here was a territory ceded by North Carolina, which
became the territory of the United States south of the Ohio, in
reference to which it was stipulated with North Carolina, that Congress
should pass no laws tending to the emancipation of slaves. But I believe
it never occurred to any one that the legislation of 1790 acted back
upon the ordinance of 1787, or furnished a rule by which any effect
could be produced upon the state of things existing under that
ordinance, in the territory to which it applied.

I certainly intend to do the distinguished chairman of the committee
no injustice; and I am not sure that I fully comprehend his argument in