efficiency of his labor alone. Both these views are partly true. The
wages of the laborer are undoubtedly determined by the efficiency of his
work, but the aggregate amount paid for labor cannot exceed the
amount properly chargeable to the wage fund without in a little time
diminishing the profits of production and ultimately the quantity of
labor employed.'

But, whichever theory be true, it is clear that protection can add
nothing to the amount of wages. It cannot increase the amount of capital
applicable to the payment of wages, unless it can be shown that the
aggregate capital of a country can be increased by legislation; nor
can it add to the efficiency of labor, for that depends upon individual
effort exclusively. A man who makes little in a day now may in a year
make much more in the same time; his labor has become more efficient.
Whether this shalt be done depends on the taste, temperament,
application, aptitude, and skill of the individual. No one will pretend
that protection can increase the aggregate of these qualities in
the labor of the country. The result is that it is impossible for
protection, either by adding to the wage fund or by increasing the
efficiency of labor, to enhance the wages of laboring men, a theory
which I shall shortly show is incontrovertibly established by the facts.

I will now, Mr. Chairman, briefly present a few of the principal
objections to a tariff for protection. As has been shown, the basis of
protection is an increase in the price of the protected products. Who
pays this increased price? I shall not stop now to consider the argument
often urged that it is paid by the foreign producer, because it can be
easily shown to the contrary by every one's experience. I shall for
this argument assume it as demonstrated that the increase of price which
protection makes is paid by the consumer. This suggests the first great