of war. Indeed the Constitution does not provide that a prisoner may be
taken at all; yet his captivity is perfectly just and constitutional.
It seems to me that the Senator does not, will not take that view of the
subject.

Again, sir, when a military commander advances, as I trust, if there are
no more unexpected great reverses, he will advance, through Virginia
and occupies the country, there, perhaps, as here, the civil law may
be silent; there perhaps the civil officers may flee as ours have been
compelled to flee. What then? If the civil law is silent, who shall
control and regulate the conquered district, who but the military
commander? As the Senator from Illinois has well said, shall it be done
by regulation or without regulation? Shall the general, or the colonel,
or the captain, be supreme, or shall he be regulated and ordered by the
President of the United States? That is the sole question. The Senator
has put it well.

I agree that we ought to do all we can to limit, to restrain, to fetter
the abuse of military power. Bayonets are at best illogical arguments. I
am not willing, except as a case of sheerest necessity, ever to permit
a military commander to exercise authority over life, liberty, and
property. But, sir, it is part of the law of war; you cannot carry
in the rear of your army your courts; you cannot organize juries; you
cannot have trials according to the forms and ceremonial of the
common law amid the clangor of arms, and somebody must enforce police
regulations in a conquered or occupied district. I ask the Senator from
Kentucky again respectfully, is that unconstitutional; or if in the
nature of war it must exist, even if there be no law passed by us to
allow it, is it unconstitutional to regulate it? That is the question,
to which I do not think he will make a clear and distinct reply.