statecraft, or they would not have allowed the Church to gain so much
power in Italy. Experience showed that I was right; for the French
wrought their own ruin by aggrandizing the Papacy and introducing Spain
into the realm of Naples.'

This criticism contains the very essence of political sagacity. It lays
bare the secret of the failure of the French under Charles, under Louis,
and under Francis, to establish themselves in Italy. Expeditions of
parade, however brilliant, temporary conquests, cross alliances, and
bloody victories do not consolidate a kingdom. They upset states and
cause misery to nations: but their effects pass and leave the so-called
conquerors worse off than they were before. It was the doom of Italy to
be ravaged by these inconsequent marauders, who never attempted by
internal organization to found a substantial empire, until the mortmain
of the Spanish rule was laid upon the peninsula, and Austria gained by
marriages what France had failed to win by force of arms.

The fourth chapter of the _Principe_ is devoted to a parallel between
Monarchies and Despotisms which is chiefly interesting as showing that
Machiavelli appreciated the stability of kingdoms based upon feudal
foundations. France is chosen as the best example of the one and Turkey
of the other. 'The whole empire of the Turk is governed by one Lord; the
others are his servants; he divides his kingdom into satrapies, to which
he appoints different administrators, whom he changes about at pleasure.
But the King of France is placed in the center of a time-honored company
of lords, acknowledged as such by their subjects and loved by them; they
have their own prerogatives, nor can the king deprive them of these
without peril.' Hence it follows that the prince who has once
dispossessed a despot finds ready to his hand a machinery of government
and a band of subservient ministers; while he who may dethrone a monarch