Milan and Naples enforced this policy. Another difficulty against which
he had to provide was in the future rather than the present. Should his
father die, and a new Pope adverse to his interests be elected, he might
lose not only the support of the Holy See, but also his fiefs of Romagna
and Urbino. To meet this contingency he took four precautions, mentioned
with great admiration by Machiavelli. In the first place he
systematically murdered the heirs of the ruling families of all the
cities he acquired--as for example three Varani at Camerino, two
Manfredi at Faenza, the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigaglia, and others
whom it would be tedious to mention. By this process he left no scion of
the ancient houses for a future Pope to restore. In the second place he
attached to his person by pensions, offices, and emoluments, all the
Roman gentry, so that he might be able to keep the new Pope a prisoner
and unarmed in Rome. Thirdly, he reduced the College of Cardinals, by
bribery, terrorism, poisoning, and packed elections, to such a state
that he could count on the creation of a Pope, if not his nominee, at
least not hostile to his interests. Fourthly, he lost no time, but
pushed his plans of conquest on with utmost speed, so as, if possible,
to command a large territory at the time of Alexander's death.
Machiavelli, who records these four points with approbation, adds: 'He
therefore, who finds it needful in his new authority to secure himself
against foes, to acquire allies, to gain a point by force or fraud,
etc., etc., could not discover an ensample more vigorous and blooming
than that of Cesare.' Such is the panegyric which Machiavelli, writing,
as it seems to me, in all good faith and innocence, records of a man
who, taken altogether, is perhaps the most selfish, perfidious, and
murderous of adventurers on record. The only fault for which he blames
him is that he did not prevent the election of Pope Julius II, by
concentrating his influence on either the Cardinal d'Amboise or a
Spaniard.