It ought to be easy to establish the truth of this assertion, since the
ruin of Italy is due to nothing else except this, that we have now for
many years depended upon mercenary arms.'[1] Here he touches the real
weakness of the Italian states. Then he proceeds to explain further the
rottenness of the Condottiere system. Captains of adventure are either
men of ability or not. If they are, you have to fear lest their ambition
prompt them to turn their arms against yourself or your allies. This
happened to Queen Joan of Naples, who was deserted by Sforza Attendolo
in her sorest need; to the Milanese, when Francesco Sforza made himself
their despot; to the Venetians, who were driven to decapitate
Carmagnuola because they feared him. The only reason why the Florentines
were not enslaved by Sir John Hawkwood was that, though an able general,
he achieved no great successes in the field. In the same way they
escaped by luck from Sforza, who turned his attention to Milan, and from
Braccio, who formed designs against the Church and Naples. If Paolo
Vitelli had been victorious against Pisa (1498), he would have held them
at discretion. In each of these cases it was only the good fortune of
the republic which saved it from a military despotism. If, on the other
hand, the mercenary captains are men of no capacity, you are defeated in
the field.

[1] See chapter xii. of the _Principe._

Proceeding to the historical development of this bad system, Machiavelli
points out how after the decline of the Imperial authority in Italy, the
Papacy and the republics got the upper hand. Priests and merchants were
alike unwilling to engage in war. Therefore they took mercenary troops
into their pay. The companies of the Sforzeschi and Bracceschi were
formed; and 'after these came all those others who have ruled this sort
of warfare down to our own days. The consequence of their valor is that