the French in the past were, as we have said, strategic. Given an Irish
Parliament that was hostile to England, or at least dubious in her
loyalty to this country, the movement of a hostile fleet against our
communications would be as dangerous now as it was in the past.

When we try to estimate what would be the feelings of an Irish
Government when England was at war, we have to consider not only the
speeches of avowed enemies of the Empire like Major McBride and the
Irish Americans, but we have also to remember the attitude adopted upon
all questions of foreign policy by the more responsible Nationalists of
the type of Mr. Dillon. Not only have the Irish Nationalist party
consistently opposed every warlike operation that British Governments
have found to be necessary, but they have also fervently attacked the
Powers on the Continent of Europe that have been suspected of friendship
to England. We have only to imagine the element of weakness and disunion
which would be introduced into our foreign policy by an Irish Parliament
that passed resolutions regarding the policy of the Governments, say, of
Russia and of France, in order to realise the immense dangers of setting
up such a Parliament when we are again confronted with a mighty
Confederation of opponents in Europe. It is admitted that the next
European war will be decided by the events of the first few days. In
order to succeed, we shall have to strike and strike quickly. But in
order that there should be swift and effective action, there should be
only one Government to be consulted. The Irish Ministry that was not
actively hostile, but only unsympathetic and dilatory, might, in many
ways, fatally embarrass Ministers at Westminster.

Moreover, another complication has been introduced by the dependence of
England upon Irish food supplies. Lord Percy points out that there are
two stages in every naval war; first, the actual engagement, and then