just been issued, giving the conclusions of sixteen specialists in
various fields, which will be briefly summarized here. Economists,
statisticians, physiologists, agricultural chemists, food specialists,
and geologists have all taken part in producing a composite view of the
whole subject; it is not a book of special contributions by individual
specialists, but is written in one cast and represents the compared and
boiled-down conclusions of the sixteen scholars.

The authors by no means regard the problem of feeding Germany without
foreign assistance as an easy and simple one; on the contrary, they say
it is a serious one, and calls for the supreme effort of the authorities
and of every individual German; and only by energetic, systematic, and
continued efforts of Government and people can they prevent a shortage
of food from negativing the success of German arms. Yet they feel bound
to grapple the problem as one calling for solution by the German people
alone, for very small imports of food products can be expected from the
neutral countries of Europe, and none at all from the United States and
other oversea countries, and the small quantities that do come in will
hardly be more than enough to make good the drain upon Germany's own
available stocks in helping to feed the people of Belgium and Poland.

The simplest statistical elements of the problem are the following:
Germany, with a population of 68,000,000, was consuming food products,
when the war broke out, equivalent to an aggregate of 90,420 billion
calories, including 2,307,000 tons of albumen; whereas the amount now
available, under unchanged methods of living and feeding, is equal to
only 67,870 billion calories, with 1,543,000 tons of albumen. Thus,
there will be an apparent deficit of 22,590 billion calories and 764,000
tons of albumen. On the other hand, the authors hold that the minimum
physiological requirements are only 56,750 billion calories, containing