moment. Among the more important reasons which convinced me of this
necessity were the general aspect of the allied situation throughout
Europe, and particularly the marked success of the Russian Army in
repelling the violent onslaughts of Marshal von Hindenburg; the apparent
weakening of the enemy on my front, and the necessity for assisting our
Russian allies to the utmost by holding as many hostile troops as
possible in the western theatre; the efforts to this end which were
being made by the French forces at Arras and in Champagne, and--perhaps
the most weighty consideration of all--the need of fostering the
offensive spirit in the troops under my command after the trying and
possibly enervating experiences which they had gone through of a severe
Winter in the trenches.

In a former dispatch I commented upon the difficulties and drawbacks
which the Winter weather in this climate imposes upon a vigorous
offensive. Early in March these difficulties became greatly lessened by
the drying up of the country and by spells of brighter weather.

I do not propose in this dispatch to enter at length into the
considerations which actuated me in deciding upon the plan, time, and
place of my attack. As mentioned above, the main attack was carried out
by units of the First Army, supported by troops of the Second Army and
the general reserve. The object of the main attack was to be the capture
of the village of Neuve Chapelle and the enemy's position at that point,
and the establishment of our line as far forward as possible to the east
of that place.

The object, nature, and scope of the attack and the instructions for the
conduct of the operations were communicated by me to Sir Douglas Haig
in a secret memorandum, dated Feb. 19.