GERMAN DEFEAT AT YPRES.

The enemy had now begun an attack more important than its predecessor,
in view of the numbers engaged in it. This attack was intended as a
renewal to the south of the effort which had just been shattered in the
north. Instead of turning our flank on the coast, it was now sought to
drive in the right of our northern army under the shock of powerful
masses. This was the Battle of Ypres.

In order to understand this long, desperate, and furious battle, we must
hark back a few days in point of time. At the moment when our cavalry
reached Roulers and Cortemark (Oct. 28) our territorial divisions from
Dunkirk, under General Biden, had occupied and organized a defensive
position at Ypres. It was a point d'appui, enabling us to prepare and
maintain our connections with the Belgian Army. From Oct. 23 two British
and French army corps were in occupation of this position, which was to
be the base of their forward march in the direction of Roulers-Menin.
The delays already explained and the strength of the forces brought up
by the enemy soon brought to a standstill our progress along the line
Poelcapelle, Paschendaele, Zandvorde, and Gheluvelt. But in spite of the
stoppage here, Ypres was solidly covered, and the connections of all the
allied forces were established. Against the line thus formed the German
attack was hurled from Oct. 25 to Nov. 13, to the north, the east, and
the south of Ypres. From Oct. 26 on the attacks were renewed daily with
extraordinary violence, obliging us to employ our reinforcements at the
most threatened points as soon as they came up. Thus, on Oct. 31, we
were obliged to send supports to the British cavalry, then to the two
British corps between which the cavalry formed the connecting link, and