remained in fear of its re-emergence; and with cause. The
resentments it left went underground and later had a revival in the
passionate zeal with which the Quebec clergy embraced the faith of
nationalism as preached by Bourassa. In one respect the school
question and its settlement proved useful. It was the exhibit
unfailingly displayed to prove upon needed occasions that the charge
was quite untrue that in directing party policy Laurier was unduly
sensitive to Quebec sentiment. In effect it was said: "Laurier made
Quebec swallow in 1896; now it is your turn"--a formula which
finally became tedious through repetition.

SUPREME IN QUEBEC

The second issue which appeared for a moment to put Laurier's grip
on Quebec in peril was the South African war. Looking back
twenty-three years it is pretty clear that Laurier's position at the
outbreak of the war, that the Canadian parliament should be
consulted as to the sending of a contingent, was wholly reasonable.
Those were the days of heady Imperialism in the English provinces;
and, vigorously stirred up by Laurier's party foes for political
purposes, it struck out with a violence which threatened to bring
serious political consequences in its train. Tarte was credited with
having declared publicly in the Russell House rotunda: "Not a man
nor a cent for South Africa," which did not help matters. The storm
was so instant and threatening that Laurier and his colleagues bowed
before it. By order-in-council Canada authorized the sending of a
contingent. Other contingents followed, and Canada took part in the
war on terms of limited liability which were agreeable to both the
British and Canadian governments.