itself with the preservation of Bourassa's fortunes. The extension
of the Manitoba boundaries was a blow to the Nationalists; they
failed in their efforts to preserve the educational rights of the
minority in the added territory. Laurier had evaded this issue;
Borden could not evade it, and by its settlement Bourassa was
damaged. Still more disastrous to the Nationalist cause was the
naval policy which Mr. Borden submitted to Parliament in the session
of 1912-1913. There was in its presentation an ingenious attempt to
reconcile the irreconcilable which deceived nobody. The contribution
of the three largest dreadnoughts that could be built was to satisfy
the Conservatives; the Nationalists were expected to be placated by
the assurance that this contribution was merely to meet an
emergency, leaving over for later consideration the question of a
permanent naval policy. But all the circumstances attending the
setting out of the policy--the report of the admiralty, the letters
of Mr. Churchill, the speeches by which it was supported with their
insistence upon the need for common naval and foreign policies--made
it only too clear that it marked the abandonment of the Canadian
naval policy which had been entered upon only four years before with
the consent of all parties and the acceptance in principle of the
Round Table view of the Imperial problem. Laurier challenged the
proposition whole-heartedly. Here was familiar fighting ground. From
the moment they joined battle with the government the Liberals found
their strength growing. They were indubitably on firm ground. They
were helped mightily by Mr. Churchill's attempted intervention in
which he belittled Canadian capacity in a manner worthy of Downing
street in its palmiest days. Mr. Churchill had the bright idea of
coming to Canada to take a hand personally in the controversy. A
Canadian-born member of the British House of Commons sounded out
various Canadians as to the nature of the reception Mr. Churchill