would receive. Mr. Churchill did not come--fortunately for the
government. The Liberals fought the proposition so furiously in the
Commons that the government had to introduce closure to secure its
passage through the commons, whereupon the Liberal majority in the
Senate threw it out. The Liberal policy was to challenge the
government to submit the issue to the people in a general election.
That within eighteen months from the date of their disastrous defeat
the Liberals should invite a second trial of strength spoke of
rapidly reviving confidence. The government ignored the challenge,
for very good reasons. In the sequel Laurier, as with all his
policies having to deal with Imperial questions, was amply
justified. The policy of Dominion navies was never again seriously
questioned in Canada; when admiralty officials, true to form,
challenged it in 1918 it was Sir Robert Borden who defended it, to
some purpose.

These developments were fatal to Quebec Nationalism as a distinct
political force under the direction of Mr. Bourassa. The ideas that
inspired it did not lapse. Nor did Mr. Bourassa, as apostle of these
ideas, lose his personal eminence. But the electors in sympathy with
these ideals began to develop views of their own as to the political
action required by the times. Their alliance with the Conservatives
had brought them no satisfaction. They had ejected the most eminent
living French-Canadian from the premiership to the very evident
injury of Quebec's influence in Confederation--that about
represented the sum of their achievements. The thought that they had
been on the wrong track began to grow in their minds. The conditions
making for the creation of the Quebec bloc were developing. The
disposition was to get together under a common leadership. It was
still a question as to whether, in the long run, that leader should