The constitution again, as one would expect under a federal scheme,
provides for the enforcement of the compact.

In the case of Ireland this is manifest. The royal veto,[21] the power
of the Courts, and ultimately of the Privy Council, to pronounce on the
constitutionality of any Irish Act, and treat it as void if it is in
excess of the authority bestowed upon the Irish legislature, the
provisions for the legal determination of constitutional questions,[22]
the arrangements as to the payment of the Irish customs into the
Imperial Exchequer, the special and very anomalous position of the
Exchequer Judges, are all attempts, whatever be their worth, to restrain
the Irish legislature and government, or in effect the Irish people,
from the undue assertion of State rights.

Restraints again are placed on the unconstitutional action of the
Imperial or Federal Parliament. They are less obvious, but at least as
real and effectual as the safeguards against the breach of the
constitution by the Irish government or legislature. They are all summed
up in the presence of the Irish representatives at Westminster. The only
legitimate reason, if legitimate reason there be, for their presence is
the guardianship of Irish rights under the constitution. It is for them
to see that these rights are held sacred. No diminution thereof can take
place without either the assent of the Irish members or else the
existence of such a majority in the Parliament at Westminster as may
override the protests of Ireland.[23] No doubt this is not an absolute
security. But whoever considers the habits of English political life
will conclude that, except in the event of the Imperial Parliament being
resolved to suspend or destroy the constitution, there exists the
highest improbability that any inroad should be made upon the privileges