is well, for it is desirable that in a civilised State every change of
institutions should be effected by constitutional methods. But should
the circumstances ever arise under which Great Britain is resolved, in
spite of the wishes of the Irish people or a large portion thereof, to
abolish Home Rule and exercise the right of reserved sovereignty, there
is no reason to expect that Irishmen who oppose British policy will
admit that her use of sovereign power is morally justifiable. By force,
or the threat of force, the controversy will, we must expect, in the
last instance, be decided. However this may be, we must now realise what
the supremacy of Parliament, at any rate to the Irish leaders who accept
it, really means. It means nothing but the right of the Imperial
Parliament of its own authority to repeal the Home Rule Bill and destroy
the new constitution. The right may be worth having. But it is not the
right to govern Ireland or to control the Irish Government; it is not a
means of government at all: it is a method of constitutional revolution,
or reaction.

Some critic will object that this supremacy of Parliament means to him
a good deal more than the mere right to abolish the constitution. So be
it. Let the objector then tell us in precise language what it does mean.
If his reply is that the term is ambiguous, that its meaning must be
construed in accordance with events, and may, according to
circumstances, be restricted or extended, then he suggests that
Parliamentary supremacy is not only an empty right, but an urgent peril.
Nothing can be more dangerous than a compact between England and Ireland
which the contracting parties construe from the very beginning in
different senses. If by asserting the supreme authority of Parliament
English statesmen mean that Parliament reserves the right to supervise
and control the government of Ireland, whilst Irishmen understand that
Parliament retains nothing more than such a kind of supremacy or