lines of policy opposed to the moral feeling and political judgment of
Great Britain, and this too where Irish legislation practically affects
Great Britain. State lotteries might be re-established, gambling tables
might be re-opened at Dublin. If the imposition of protective duties on
imported goods is forbidden, there is nothing apparently to prevent the
reintroduction of Protection into Ireland by the payment of bounties;
there is certainly nothing to prohibit the repeal or suspension of the
Factory Acts, so that English manufacturers might be compelled to
compete with Irish rivals who are freed from the limits imposed upon
excessive labour by the humanity or the wisdom of England. The power of
the Irish Parliament to pass laws which in the eyes of Englishmen are
unwise or inequitable, is, it will be urged, an essential part of the
policy of Home Rule. I admit that this is so. But this makes it the more
necessary that English electors should realise what this essential
characteristic of Home Rule means, or may mean. The Nonconformist
conscience exposed Irish Home Rulers to painful humiliation and possible
ruin by forbidding them to follow the political leader of their choice
to whom they had deliberately renewed their allegiance. Is it certain
that Englishmen who could not tolerate the official authority of Mr.
Parnell will bear the official leadership, say of Mr. Healy, if employed
to carry out the economical principles of Mr. Davitt?

The legislative powers, ample as they are, of the Irish Parliament are
in some respects restricted, but what the Parliament cannot accomplish
by law it could accomplish by resolution. The expressed opinion of a
legislature entitled to speak in the name of the people of Ireland must
always command attention, and may exert decisive influence. Suppose that
the Irish House of Commons asserts in respectful, but firm, language,
the right of the Irish people to establish a protective tariff; suppose
that when England is engaged in a diplomatic, or an armed, contest with