knowledge of the Mathematics does not always produce justness of thought
in matters foreign to that science. We find here a man who seeks only
for censure, and knows not what he would have: he fights with his own
shadow, and for the most part does not understand the thoughts of the
author he attacks; and when he does understand them draws the most
groundless consequences that ever were heard of. His gloomy and
unhappily subtle mind cannot bear the light which Grotius presents to
him. The embroiled ideas and distinctions of his Peripatetic philosophy
form round him a thick cloud impenetrable by the strongest rays of
truth. This is Barbeyrac's judgment of him. Felde met with some
partisans of Grotius who confuted him: Theodorus Graswinckel, Advocate,
his relation and friend, undertook his defence; and the redoubled
efforts of the Helmsted Professor did not lessen his book in the esteem
of the public. Not that the work is perfect; this, his admirers and
those who were most disposed to do him justice, frankly own.

His general principles touching natural law are very solid; but they are
too intricate, and it requires deep meditation to unfold them. He does
not sufficiently shew the chain of consequences to be deduced from them,
and applied to particular subjects; which gave certain authors of little
penetration, or candour, occasion to say, that after laying down his
principles he makes no use of them, and builds his decisions on a quite
different thing. He might have prevented these rash censures by
enlarging somewhat more, and pointing out on each head the connection of
the proofs he makes use of, with the general principles from whence they
are drawn.

With regard to the law of nations, which he considers as an arbitrary
law in itself, but acquiring the force of a law by the tacit consent of
nations, Barbeyrac observes that in the sense he understands it, and has