Cabool. And though it could not lead to the same awful results where
there had not been the same elaborate _preparation_ of folly, and upon
ground so much nearer to the means of rectification, still it was then
sufficient to tarnish the lustre of our arms for the time, and, under
worse circumstances, would menace worse misfortunes. Neither is this
all; there are other infirmities in our eastern system than the vicious
selection of generals.

But all the topics proper to this fifth head will fall more naturally
under a paper expressly applying itself to India; and for the present we
shall confine ourselves to the previous four.

I. And _first_, then, as regards the original motive assigned for the
Affghan expedition. What profit in prospect, or what danger in
reversion, moved us to so costly an enterprise? We insist singly on its
cost, which usually proves a sufficient _sufflamen_ in these days to the
belligerent propensities of nations. Cicero mentions the advocate by
name who first suggested the question of _Cui bono_, as a means of
feeling backwards in a case of murder for the perpetrator. Who was it
that had been interested in the murder? But the same question must be
equally good as a means of feeling forwards to the probable wisdom of a
war. What was the nature of the benefit apprehended, and who was to reap
it? The answer to this very startling question, in the case of the
Affghan expedition, stood thus for a long time on the part of our own
unofficial press--that the object had been to forestall Russia, driving
with headlong malice _en route_ for the Indus, by surprising her
advanced guard in Kohistan. Certainly, if the surprise were all, there
might be something plausible in the idea. If the Russians should ever
reach Kohistan, we will answer for their being exceedingly surprised at
finding an English camp in that region for the purpose of entertaining