Whilst, therefore, we recognize, as a policy worthy of an Indian
statesman, the attempt to raise up a barrier in Affghanistan by way of
defensive outwork to India, we conceive that all which should have been
desired was a barrier against the Affghans themselves, by means of
guarantees reposing on the structure of the Affghan government, and not
any barrier against Persia as the agent of Russia; because, from the
social condition of the Affghans, Persia was always sure to raise up
barriers against herself, in exact proportion as she should attempt to
intermeddle with Affghan affairs. The remedy was certain to grow up
commensurately with the evil.

But now, quitting the question of the _when_, or why particularly at
that time Lord Auckland interfered with Affghanistan, let us touch on
the much more important question of the _how_, or by what machinery it
was that he proposed during this interference to realize his object?
Here comes the capital blunder, as we regard it, of our Affghan policy.
Lord Auckland started from the principle--and in _that_ doubtless he was
right--that the security sought for Western India could be found only in
a regular treaty of alliance with an Affghan government--firm at least
by its tenure, if circumstances forbade it to be strong by its action.
But where was such a government to be found? Who, in the distracted
state of Affghan society, was the man presumptuous enough to guarantee
any general submission to his authority? And, if no man could say this
for himself, could we say it _for_ him? Was there any great Affghan
philosopher in a cave, for whom Lord Auckland could become sponsor that
he should fulfil all the purposes of British diplomacy? We are come upon
evil ground, where not a step can be taken without cutting away right
and left upon friend and foe. Never, in fact, do we remember upon any
subject so many untruths as were uttered upon this by our own journals,
English and Indian; not untruths of evil intention, but untruths of