Lucan says of Caesar, when besieged in the fortified palace of the
Ptolemies at Alexandria, that often, whilst thrown on his most difficult
defence, the matchless soldier became the assailant--

"Obsessusque gerit, tanta est constantia mentis,
_Offensoris_ opus."

But what _he_ did as a trophy of his superiority, we did by imbecile
improvidence and for final ruin. Yet even these shocking neglects or
oversights were not the worst. Let us now suggest what _were_. Wherefore
were the cantonments placed in proximity so close to Cabool? Let that be
answered, and we shall see the early commencement of our infatuation.
Two considerations will clench the case, and then we shall leave it.
1st, The cantonments were never meant to act upon the city of Cabool:
that task was thrown upon the Bala Hissar from its situation. And yet no
trial had ever been made of the power possessed by that fortress. The
private houses were known to be forts: not until rebellion commenced was
it ascertained of what strength they were; and eventually the city
proved more formidable to the Bala Hissar than the Bala Hissar to the
city. Such a blunder of ignorance and miscalculation, we believe, was
never heard of. But, 2dly, Even that was a trifle by comparison with the
capital evil--and the capital evil was this. The enemy was allowed,
throughout the autumn of 1841, to accumulate _ad libitum_ in Cabool.
Retainers of the chiefs, Ghilzyes and others, gathered unwatched
throughout October. Now mark what followed from our choice of
cantonments. Had they been fixed fifteen or even ten miles off, the
impossibility of marching daily to and from Cabool would have strangled
the rebellion in its first three days. The evil which crushed ourselves,
of having always at sunset to go homewards, would have been thrown upon
the enemy, and with as much more of ruinous effect as the distance was